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MUTUAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS:
REHABILITATION OF MEMBERSHIP
RIGHTS
David W. Yancey*
INTRODUCTION

Customers who deposit their savings dollars in mutual savings and loan associations are called "members."' The law provides that members in mutually organized savings and loan associations shall possess mutually shared rights of control and ownership of their savings institutions. 2 Because of legislative inaction,
poor agency supervision, regressive case law and public unawareness, however, mutual members in fact enjoy few of these membership rights and, in most instances, the members lack the
powers necessary to enforce the rights they do possess. As a result, members have only minimal control over the management
of their savings and loan associations.3 Because association managements are subjected to only minimal control by members and
because government regulation frequently has been inadequate,
managements have been virtually free from supervision in many
cases. The lack of supervision often has resulted in the emergence of conflicts of interest within association managements.4
* B.A. 1970, J.D. 1974, Stanford University; member, California Bar. The
author is engaged in private practice in San Francisco.
1. See note 24 infra.
2. 12 C.F.R. § 544.1 (1974).
3. This contrasts with industry heritage. Before the turn of the century each

member customer in a mutual savings and loan association was intimately involved with his association, playing simultaneously the roles of saver, prospective
borrower and owner.

The association was small, highly localized and responsive

to membership and community needs. Members attended and voted at regular
monthly meetings and also contributed their services to the operation of the association. They were fully informed of association activities and operations. A.
TECK, MUTUAL SAVINGS BANKS AND SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS:

ASPECTS

As associations increased in size, however, membership
OF GROwTH 23 (1968).
participation in association activities decreased. Today, most decisions concerning an association's activities are made exclusively by the management with little
input from members.
4. Herman, Conflicts of Interest in the Savings and Loan Industry, in 2
STUDY OF THE SAVINGS AND LOAN 893, 941, 953 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
Herman]. See also Wall Street Journal, Dec. 31, 1971, at 16, col. 1. Conflicts of interest arise when the directors or officers of mutual savings and
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The harm caused to a savings and loan association by these conflicts of interest may vary in degree. At the extreme such conflicts may result in insolvency and eventual collapse of the association, but more frequently, they may cause a gradual decay of
association efficiency, service and responsiveness to membership
needs.5
An in-depth examination of the conflict problem is a difficult
task beyond the scope of this article. Most of the information
regarding management conflicts is found only in the private sector and is unavailable for public scrutiny. Even government supervisory authorities do not have full access to relevant information.6 In addition, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
(FHLBB) considers the information it does have in its possession
regarding "problem" associations to be confidential and will not
release it freely. 7 Undoubtedly, most savings and loan officials
are of the highest integrity and competence. Nevertheless, there
appears to be some room for improvement." In the only extensive study of the conflicts of interest problem to date,9 it was concluded that
[a]lthough conflict of interest is a pervasive characteristic of
private (and public) enterprise, it is perhaps more deeply in-

bedded and institutionalized in the savings and loan business
than in most industries. 10
In all probability the conflicts within association managements and resultant debilitating effects would be minimized if
members had greater control over management activities. After
a description of the industry, this article undertakes a three-part
analysis of the present deficiencies in the membership rights of
association members. The lack of effective control rights is conloan associations create situations where their personal interests and those
of the association conflict with one another. Conflicts are normally characterized by self-dealing by directors or officers when acting in behalf of the association. Conflicts of interest may spring from willful violation of the law, or
mere negligence or incompetency. Common examples of conflicts are where officers and directors engage in the unauthorized sale of association control; where
ancillary tie-in business activities exists; where nepotism exists among directors,
officers and employees; or where loans are made to friends or relatives of officers
and directors. Herman, at 771-73, 798-801, 803-86, 891-92, 945.
5. Herman, supra note 4, at 943.
6. Id. at 764.
7. T. MARVELL, THE FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK BOARD 153 (1969) [hereinafter cited as MARVELL].
8. Although the degree of abuse is difficult to quantify, clearly some savings
and loan officials are capitalizing on available conflict situations. Wall Street
Journal, Dec. 31, 1971, at 16, col. 1.
9. Herman, supra note 4, at 941; HOUSE AND HOME, Oct. 1970, at 10.
10. Herman, supra note 4, at 941. This passage refers to the savings and
loan industry as a whole, including both mutual and stock associations. In fact
it would appear that for various reasons some types of conflicts are more prevalent
in stock associations than in mutuals. Id. at 944. An analysis of conflicts and
reform within the stock association is beyond the scope of this article, however.

1975]

MUTUAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS

637

sidered, as are the procedural obstacles preventing effective implementation of existing membership rights. In addition, weaknesses in the information-dissemination structure are examined.
Throughout the analysis, numerous proposals for reform are suggested.
I. DESCRIPTION OF THE INDUSTRY
A. Size and Purpose
The significance of the lack of effective supervision of mutual savings and loan associations by members is best appreciated
if viewed in light of the importance of the industry itself. The
savings and loan industry has experienced tremendous growth in
2
recent years." Industry assets presently exceed $272 billion,'
having recently surpassed the total assets of the insurance industry, to make savings and loan associations the second largest's
of the nation's financial intermediaries. 14 In addition, the industry
now serves 55 million savers and 12.2 million borrowers, and employs 151,400 persons.' 5
The primary objectives of savings and loan associations are to
encourage thrift through the establishment of savings accounts and
to provide for the economical financing of homes.' 6 In fulfilling the
latter objective, savings and loans have become the nation's leading
source of residential credit.' 7
The rapid growth and substantial size of the industry, particularly in the area of home financing, illustrates the significance
of savings and loan associations in today's economy. This also illustrates the potential for waste and abuse if association managements are not properly supervised.
11. From 1960 to 1970, total industry assets climbed 104.7 billion dollars.

UNITED STATES SAVINGS AND LOAN LEAGUE, 1973 SAVINGS AND LOAN FACT BOOK
53 (1973). From 1970 through 1973, the assets of the savings and loan business
increased by 96.2 billion dollars, to produce a growth rate greater than that of
any other major type of financial intermediary. UNITED STATES SAVINGS AND
LOAN LEAGUE, 1974 SAVINGS AND LOAN FACT BOOK 54 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as 1974 FACT BOOK].
12. Savings and LOan News, Sept., 1974, at 74.
13. Commercial banks rank first. In addition to commercial banks, savings

and loans and life insurance companies, financial intermediaries also include
credit unions, mutual savings banks (not to be confused with mutual savings and
loan associations), and finance and investment companies. 1974 FACT BOOK, supra note 11, at 53-54.

14. The term financial intermediary means in essence a money merchant.
Like other types of merchants, financial intermediaries buy money at wholesale
prices (interest paid on depositor accounts) and sell at retail prices (interest received upon loans made). In return for providing services and bearing a risk,
they realize a profit.
15. 1974 FACT BOOK, supra note 11, at 34, 53, 108.
16. 12 C.F.R. § 544.1(a) (3) (1974).
17. 1974 FACT BOOK, supra note 11, at 34.
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CorporateStructure

Although the savings and loan industry is dominated by a mutual form of corporate ownership,18 several states allow savings and
loan associations to have either a mutual or stock form of ownership structure.'"
Stock associations. Under a stock form of corporate ownership, individuals contribute the permanent capital to the savings
and loan association in exchange for an ownership interest evidenced by the association's issuance of stock certificates to those
contributing capital.20 These shares, which are transferable and
may be traded in the open market, represent the stockholder's pro
rata ownership in the association. 2 ' In contrast to the mutual association, these stockholders need not be savers in the association. In
most cases, the savers in a stock association are merely customers,
having no rights of association control or ownership. 22
Thus the structure and ownership of a stock association is
identical to that of an ordinary corporation, the primary purpose of
which is to maximize growth and profit for the owners. 23
Mutual associations.Under a mutual corporate structure, the
capital of an association is contributed by its depositers. The individual depositers become "members" 24 or partial owners of the association and, as such, have the right to vote on association actions
and affairs.2 5 Thus, unlike a stock association, a mutual association
issues no capital stock and ownership is in the hands of savers and
not stockholders.
Numerous rights and interests accrue to individuals who become depositers in a mutual savings and loan association. In addition to the right to vote, all savers in a mutual association have the
right to share in the earnings and assets of the association in propor18. Mutually owned associations represent 87.1 percent of all associations and
hold 78.2 percent of total industry assets. 1974 FACT BOOK, supra note 11, at
60.
19. See notes 33-34 and accompanying text infra.
20. ABA HANDBOOK OF SAVINGS AND LOAN LAw 12 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as ABA HANDBOOK].
21. Id.
22. See Herman, supra note 4, at 763, 782.
23. K.

ScoTr,

CONVERSION

OF MUTUAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS TO

FoRM: PARTII (1974) [hereinafter cited as K. SCOTT].
24. 12 C.F.R. § 544.1(a)(4) (1974). In a corporation that issues capital
stock, the owners buy shares and are called stockholders. If a corporation has
no capital stock-a mutual-its owners are called members rather than stockholders and occupy the dual roles of both customer and owner of the corporation.
See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1588 (4th ed. 1968).
It should be noted that borrowers from the mutual association are also "members" with voting rights but they have none of the additional "ownership" rights
which accrued to the savers or depositors. 12 C.F.R. § 544.1(a) (4) (1974).
STOCK
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tion to the amount of their savings on deposit. 26 Federal law provides that a mutual association's board of directors may declare

earnings dividends to be paid to its depositors, 27 not to exceed
present interest rate ceilings. 28 The Code of Federal Regulations

further provides that in the event of voluntary or involuntary solvent dissolution of a mutual association, all depositors are entitled
to a share of the association's net assets, prorated to the value of
29
their savings on deposit.

This mutually shared form of business enterprise is intended

specifically to promote a cooperative self-help effort among members within the association, and to maximize service and conve-

nience to the association's members.30
This article focuses on the mutual-as opposed to the stock-

savings and loan association and discusses the present deficiencies
in membership rights of member savers in this type of enterprise.
C.

Regulation

Although savings and loan associations are privately managed, their formation and operation are subject to extensive gov-

ernment regulation and supervision.

1

Associations may be char-

tered12

by authority of either a state or the federal government. At
present, 22 states charter both stock and mutual associations. 3 All
other states and, until recently, the federal government 4 charter
25. ABA HANDBOOK, supra note 14, at 34.
26. See Elliot v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 233 F. Supp. 578, 595 (S.D.
Cal. 1964); Durnin v. Allentown Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 218 F. Supp. 716, 72021 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
27. 12C.F.R. § 544.1(a)(10) (1974).
28. Id. §§ 526.1 to 526.5-1.
29. Id.§ 544.1(a)(10).
30. See M. BODFISH & A. TIEOBALD, SAVINGS AND LoAN PRINCIPLES 4 (1940);
K. Scorr, supra note 18; Herman, supra note 4, at 95; Hearings on S.
1671 Before the Subcomm. on Housing and Urban Affairs of the Senate Comm.
on Banking and Urban Affairs, 92d Cong., Ist Sess., at 224 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as 1971 Hearings].
31. For example, all federal savings and loan associations are regulated by
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. The Board has promulgated numerous rules
and regulations concerning the organization and operation of an association.
Among other things, the regulations prescribe the type of savings accounts which
an association may accept, the loans it may make, and the other investments it
may enter into. 12 C.F.R. § 545.1-.11 (1974).
32. A charter is essentially an approval, by the appropriate state or federal
governmental authority, of an association's articles of incorporation.
33. The 22 states are: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Hawaii,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Nevada, New
Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and
Wyoming. 1971 Hearings,supra note 30, at 111.
34. Until recently the federal government chartered only mutual savings and
loan associations. 12 C.F.R. § 1464(a) (1974). This scheme has now been
modified to allow federally chartered mutual associations to convert to federally

SANTA CLARA LAWYER

[Vol. 15

only mutual associations. As in the commercial banking field, both
federally chartered and state chartered savings and loan institutions operate side by side in the local community.
The savings and loan industry is regulated by a complicated
web of overlapping state and federal laws and supervisory authori-

ty. State savings and loans are subject to their respective state supervising agencies. The primary regulatory agency for federal associations is the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB). 5 By act of
Congress,"6 the FHLBB is given broad discretion to prescribe

rules and regulations 7 for the organization, incorporation, examination, operation, and regulation of federal savings and loan asso-

ciations.18 Other duties of the FHLBB include overseeing the
twelve Federal Home Loan Banks 9 and the Federal Savings and

Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC).40

chartered stock associations in states where the laws authorize the operation of
state chartered stock associations, or in states where all associations are federally
chartered. 12 U.S.C. § 1725 (1974). The effects of the new legislation are yet
to be observed. Some commentators fear, however, that widespread conversions
of savings associations from mutual to stock forms of organization will degrade
the service quality of the industry to the detriment of the saving public. Note,
Mutual-to-Stock Conversions and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, 82 YALE
L.J. 559 (1973).
35. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board is an independent agency in the executive branch of the federal government. It is headed by a three-member, bipartisan board, whose members are appointed by the President and confirmed by
the Senate for 4-year terms. The Board's operations are independently financed
by its member institutions, although Congress does determine expense ceilings on
operations each year. FED. HOME LOAN BANK BOARD J., Apr. 1972, at 2.
36. The major source of FHLBB authority is the Home Owner's Loan Act
of 1933, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461 et seq. (1970). Additional supervisorial powers are derived from the National Housing Act of 1934, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1701 et seq. (1969),
the Federal Home Loan Bank Act of 1932, 12 U.S.C. § 1421 et seq. (1969),
and the Financial Institutions Supervisory Act of 1969, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1464, 1724,
1728, 1730, 1730a, 1813, 1817 etseq. (1969).
37. Current regulations for the federal savings and loan system are codified
at 12 C.F.R. § 541-556.6 (1974).
38. Section 5(a) of the Home Owner's Loan Act of 1933, 12 U.S.C. § 1464
(a) (1970) states:
In order to provide local mutual thrift institutions in which people may
invest their funds and in order to provide for the financing of homes,
the Board is authorized, under such rules and regulations as it may prescribe, to provide for the organization, incorporation, examination, operation, and regulation of associations to be known as "Federal Savings
and Loan Associations" and to issue charters therefor, giving primary
consideration to the best practices of local mutual thrift and home-financing institutions in the United States.
39. Federal Home Loan Banks are central credit facilities and sources of secondary liquidity for member savings and loan associations. Federal Home Loan
Banks regulate the rate of interest paid and the liquidity of its members. MARVELL, supra note 7, at 126. Membership in the federal home loan bank system is
mandatory for federal associations and optional for state associations. Member
associations hold over 97.7 percent of all savings and loan assets in the United
States. 1974 FACT,BOOK, supra note 11, at 111-12.
40. Members of FSLIC are subject to a voluminous set of regulations. 12
C.F.R. §§ 561-572.3 (1974). The function of FSLIC is discussed at notes 178
and 184 infra.
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Because federal savings and loan associations clearly dominate the mutual sector of the savings and loan industry,4 a this article will concern itself primarily with federal regulatory law
associations and will make reference to state law only where appropriate.

II.

DEFICIENCIES IN MEMBERSHIP RIGHTS: THE NEED
FOR REFORM

In theory, depositor members in mutual savings and loan associations own the assets and earned surpluses of their associations. 2 In practice, however, these ownership rights are largely illusory. Members do not possess many normal incidents of ownership, such as rights of control over association activities and operations and effective procedures to enforce these rights. As a result,
members are unable to supervise and control effectively the actions
of association managements. As noted earlier, this lack of membership supervision can result and has, in many instances, resulted
in a high incidence of conflict of interest within association managements.4 3 This author submits that a number of reforms in the
mutual savings and loan industry are necessary to strengthen the
membership rights of member savers.
A.

Control Rights

In general. Members of mutual savings and loan associations
possess the basic right to vote on certain corporate affairs. 44 In
theory, this franchise right provides members with several methods
of controlling the association and its operations. First, members
may meet annually to elect a board of directors from among their
membership.4 5 Since the board is charged with general management authority, 46 including selection of officers 47 and determination of association policies and operations, the right to elect the
board provides member savers with a means of indirectly affecting
association operations. In addition to their right to elect directors,
members may vote to amend association by-laws. 48 Members also
must be consulted and their approval obtained before certain
fundamental structural changes in the association may be made. 9
41. Federals hold 70.5 percent of all assets in the mutual sector. Derived
from statistics in 1974 FAcr BoOK, supra note 11, at 57, 59.
42. 12 C.F.R. § 544.1(a)(10) (1974). See notes 24-30 and accompanying
text supra.
43. See notes 4-10 and accompanying text supra.
44. 12 C.F.R. § 544.1(a)(4) (1974).
45. Id. § 544.1(a)(5).

46. Id.§ 544.5(7)(g).
47. Id.§ 544.5(5).
48. This action is subject to FHLBB approval. Id.§ 544.5(11).
49. The following actions must be approved by membership vote: amendment
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One important right of control, however, is not available to
members. Association managements are not required to seek
membership approval for proposed mergers5" except upon special
demand from the FHLBB. 51 When an association enters into a
merger, frequently a new management assumes control. If the
new management lacks competency or is not committed to providing adequate services and conveniences to members, the decision to merge may result in a reduction of benefits enjoyed by
association members." Since a merger could thereby affect membership interests adversely, membership approval should be a prerequisite to any decision to merge.
Director removal. Another power necessary for full membership control of an association is the right to remove directors from
office prior to the expiration of their terms.5" At common law the
doctrine of "amotion" provided that shareholders in a private corporation had the right to remove any director from office for
cause. 5 4 Clearly, the directors of a financial corporation, such as
a mutual savings and loan association, entrusted with substantial
cash assets, should be subject to standards of scrutiny and discipline which are at least as rigorous as those applied to directors
of other private corporations. Thus, sound policy dictates that the
"amotion" doctrine be extended to mutual savings and loan
associations.
In a number of states the doctrine has been extended to savings and loans by statutes providing for the removal of directors
with or without cause by a vote of the membership. 5 Federal statutes and regulations, however, are silent in this area. To remove any
of the charter provisions, id. § 544.1(a)(11); conversion from a federally char-

tered to a state chartered association, id. § 546.5(d), or vice versa, id. § 543.8;
and conversion of a state chartered mutual to a stock association, id. § 563.221(g).

50. This is true at the state level as well. Attempts to require a membership
vote on this issue have been unsuccessful. See, e.g., McGill v. Leverington-Roxborough Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 44 Pa. 483, 282 A.2d 280 (1971).
51.

12 C.F.R. § 546.2(d) (1974).

52. For an example of this abuse, see Wall Street Journal, Dec. 31, 1971, at
16, col. 1.
53. In federal associations directors are elected for periods of 3 years. 12
C.F.R. § 544.1(a)(5) (1974).
54. 19 C.J.S., Corporations, § 738. See also Campbell v. Loew's, Inc., 36
Del. Ch. 563, 572, 134 A.2d 852, 858 (1957), where the Delaware Court of
Chancery concluded:
,T]here is no provision in our statutory law providing for the removal
of directors by stockholder action. . . . Considering the damage a director might be able to inflict upon his corporation, . . . the doubt must
be resolved by construing the statutes and by-laws as leaving untouched
the question of director removal for cause. This being so, the Court is
free to conclude on reason that the stockholders have such inherent
power. I therefore conclude that as a matter of Delaware corporation
law the stockholders do have the power to remove directors for cause.
See also Auer v. Dressel, 306 N.Y. 427, 118 N.E.2d 590 (1954).
55. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CoDE § 810 (West 1955); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 301.29 (1969); REv. CODE OF WASH. ANN. § 23A.08.380 (1969).
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doubt on the question, the FHLBB should issue regulations giving
member savers in federal associations the power to remove directors from office.
At present, the FHLBB retains the power to remove directors

for serious misbehavior while in office. 56 This remedy, however, is
not satisfactory for two reasons. First, the remedy can be initiated
only by the FHLBB, and members have only informal methods

with which to stimulate FHLBB action.57 Second, grounds for
FHLBB action must be based not only upon a violation of the law

or of a fiduciary duty by a director, but also on such personal dishonesty as places the financial integrity of the association in jeopardy.5 8 In many instances members of a mutual savings and loan
association may have good reason to seek the removal of a direc-

tor (if, for example, the director is incompetent or uncooperative), but because the director's actions are not technically dishonest, his removal is not possible.

Members of federal savings and loan associations can have no
meaningful control over the operations of the association if the

power to remove directors from office remains solely in the hands
of the FHLBB. Steps must be taken by the Board to extend this
power to the member savers.
Loss of membership status. It is plain that the right to retain
one's membership status is essential to the effective exercise of
membership rights. Nevertheless, under federal charter provi-

sions, the board of directors of a federal savings and loan association has the power to redeem all or any part of the association's
members' savings accounts at any time sufficient funds are on
hand.59 When an association exercises its redemption power, it
56.

12 U.S.C. § 1464(d) (4) (A) (1970 ) provides:
Whenever, in the opinion of the Board [The Federal Home Loan
Bank Board], any director or officer of an association has committed
any violation of law, rule, or regulation, or of a cease-and-desist order
which has become final, or has engaged or participated in any unsafe
or unsound practice in connection with the association, or has committed
or engaged in any act, omission, or practice which constitutes a breach
of his fiduciary duty as such director or officer, and the Board determines that the association has suffered or will probably suffer substantial
financial loss or other damage or that the interests of its savings account
holders could be seriously prejudiced by reason of such violation or practice or breach of fiduciary duty, and that such violation or practice or
breach of fiduciary duty is one involving personal dishonesty on the part
of such director or officer, the Board may serve upon such director or
officer a written notice of its intention to remove him from office.
See Miami Beach Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Callander, 256 F.2d 410 (5th Cir.
1958).
57. Such methods would include little more than writing letters and making
telephone calls to the FHLBB. See notes 109-14 and accompanying text infra,
for a discussion of this procedural deficiency.
58. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(4)(A) (1970).
59. Redemption is subject to some limitations: (1) 30 days notice must be
given; (2) redemption must not impair association capital; (3) at the time of re-
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buys back a member's account by paying that member the full
withdrawal value of the account. The redemption power is absolute and may be exercised by the board of directors at its complete
discretion. 60
The effect of the redemption power upon membership control rights is readily apparent. As noted earlier, maintenance of a
savings account is essential to maintenance of membership status in
a mutual savings and loan association. 6 ' It follows naturally that
to vest absolute power in the board of directors to terminate a
member's account and, therefore, his membership can be a powerful deterrent or complete bar to the exercise of meaningful membership control. Members who wish to vote for a new management or substantially alter an association policy, contrary to the
board's wishes, may simply be eliminated from association membership without cause by the redemption of their savings ac12
count.
There is another way that the redemption power can be
abused by a self-serving board of directors. Association membership is a prerequisite to board membership, "and a director . . .
cease[s] to be a director when he ceases to be a member."6 3 It is
easy to see that through the power of redemption, a dissident board
member--duly elected by the association's membership--could
be removed without cause by a simple majority vote of the board of
directors.6 4 Such unrestrained discretion by the board could easily
strangle minority opinion and membership control in an association.
Neither the FHLBB nor the courts have acted to prevent such
arbitrary termination of membership rights. In Daurelle v. Traders
FederalSavings and Loan Association,6 5 the association's board of
directors redeemed a member's account for the sole purpose of preventing his participation in the association's annual elections and
demption there can be no withdrawal requests on file that have remained unpaid
for more than thirty days; (4) in no case shall the redemption price be less than
the full withdrawal value of the savings account. In practice these requirements
place virtually no restraint upon arbitrary redemption by the board of directors.

12 C.F.R. § 544.1(a)(7) (1974).
60. Id.
61. See notes 13-14 and accompanying text supra.

62. In the opinion of one observer, a member in a mutual savings and loan
association "has a vote until he cares to exercise it, and then he ceases to have
a vote, if the board so decides." Statement by P. Riordan, general counsel for
the National Association of Mutual Savings Banks in Hearings on H.R. 258 Before the Subcomm. on Banking Supervision and Insurance of the House Comm.
on Banking and Currency, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., at 206 (1963).

63. 12C.F.R.§ 544.1(a) (5) (1974).
64. Redemption, like all other actions of the board of directors, requires a
mere simple majority vote. Id. § 544.5(4).
65.

143 W. Va. 674, 104 S.E.2d 320 (1958).
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his candidacy for a position on the board. The court held that no
good faith reason for such termination need be shown.66 The Daurelle court found the redemption to be "in all respects regular and
valid.

' 67

The rights incident to membership will remain meaningless if
directors of associations are allowed to continue silencing criticism
or opposition by members simply by redeeming the members' accounts. Redemption, if permitted at all, should be subjected to rigorous standards of business necessity and good faith.
One solution to the problem of the abuse of redemption power
would be to require that all redemptions be accomplished through
a method of pro rata redemption or redemption by lot. Under pro
rata redemption, if a management determined that redemption of
accounts was necessary, it could redeem only a pro rata portion
of each member's account. Under redemption by lot, the management could redeem only those accounts which were chosen randomly by drawing lots. If association managements were required
to use either of these methods in their redemption procedure, they
would be prevented from selectively redeeming the accounts of
members who have expressed opposition to management or its
policies.
Summary. In the foregoing section we have examined the
ownership control rights presently available to members in mutual
savings and loan associations. Like most corporations, the mutual
savings and loan association, is, in theory, a representative democracy. Ultimate control is vested in the members, who elect representatives to manage and operate the business. It has become apparent, however, that the mere possession of these rights has not
given association members adequate control over the operation of
their savings and loan associations. It is therefore essential that
effective enforcement procedures to implement these rights and
powers also be made available to members savers. Without such
procedures, the few ownership and control rights which members
do possess are rendered meaningless. Unfortunately, the procedures presently available to implement membership rights are
woefully inadequate.
B.

ProceduralInadequacies

In many crucial areas of membership control, the law either is
silent or provides only general guidance concerning the procedures
available to enforce the few rights possessed by mutual savings and
loan members. It is left to association managements to create spe66. Id. at -,

67. Id.

104 S.E.2d at 336.
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cific rules regarding such procedures. While acting entirely within
the law, it is possible for managements to create procedural requirements which render ownership and control rights feeble and
ineffective.
At the heart of ownership control is the member's voting
right, 6 the source of both initiative69 and veto powers70 within the
association's purportedly democratic structure. Certain management practices have made it extremely difficult for members of an
association to exercise effectively their right to vote, whether individually or collectively, 71 and voting procedures presently available to members have neither prevented nor limited these practices.
Notice requirements. A member of a mutual savings and loan
association cannot effectively exercise his right to vote unless he
receives timely notice of the association's annual meetings. The
present notice requirements under the federal regulations are too
lenient and subject to management manipulation. The basic notice
provision for federal associations 72 requires only that notice78 of
each annual meeting be published in a local newspaper of general
circulation once a week for the two successive calendar weeks immediately preceding the week in which the meeting is to be held. In
74
the alternative, notice may be mailed to members at their homes.
The "loophole" provision for management is that these notice requirements may be completely waived by membership consent. 75
Similar notice provisions required for special meetings can also be
waived. 76 The significance of the waiver "loophole" is illustrated
by the fact that a waiver provision could be included by the management among the materials signed by a member saver at the time
he opens his account with the association. The management could
require a depositor to forfeit his right to written notification of
meetings as a condition of membership in the association. 77 If all
68. See notes 44-52 and accompanying text supra.
69. For example, it is only through the voting power that members can initiate the election of directors, removal of directors, and amendment of by-laws.
70. Likewise, it is only through the voting power that members can ex-

press their approval or disapproval of charter amendments, conversions, and voluntary dissolutions.
71.

See notes 72-78 and accompanying text infra.

72. 12C.F.R. § 544.5(3)(a) (1974).
73. Id.

The form of the notice need only include the name of the association

and the place and time the meeting is to convene. There is no requirement that
matters to be voted upon at the meeting be included in the notice.
74. Id.

In either case, a similar notice must also be posted conspicuously in

the association's office during the 14 days immediately preceding the date of the
meeting.
75. Id.
76. Id. § 544.5(3)(b).

The sole difference is that notice of special meetings,

if not waived, must include a statement of the purpose or purposes for which the
special meeting is called. Id.
77. It should be noted, however, that such a clause in the materials signed
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depositors agreed to such a provision, the management would be
required to give no public notice of meetings.
Thus, the federal regulations provide association management with an easy method of avoiding entirely the requirement of
giving notice to members of annual or special meetings of the association. 78 To strengthen the voting rights of association members,
the waiver provision should be eliminated, and a provision requiring notice by mail should be enacted.
The present federal regulations respecting notice clearly favor the management. Unlike the members, who in most cases know
little or nothing about association meetings unless they actively
seek such information, 79 management can insure itself advance notice of any membership initiative which might arise at an association meeting. Under an optional provision authorized by the
FHLBB, the association's by-laws may require that any new business to be taken up at an annual meeting be stated in writing and
filed with the association's secretary at least thirty days prior to the
meeting date.80 The optional provision may further provide that
no other proposals may be acted upon at the meeting. 81 By including such a provision in the by-laws of the association, management may always be forewarned of potential surprise or opposition. An additional advantage management may gain over members stems from the fact that association meetings have no minimum quorum requirements. There is no requirement that a certain percent of the members be present at association meetings.
The federal regulations provide that any number of members
present at a meeting constitutes a quorum.8 2 Thus, meetings may
be held, and binding decisions made regarding association affairs,
with only a handful of association directors and officers participating, further reducing any incentive management may have to encourage membership attendance. 8
A member's right to vote has little meaning unless he is able to
by the member saver might be attacked as constituting an adhesion contract provision.
78. There are perhaps two exceptions to this "loophole" mechanism. Actions
to convert an association from federal to state charter and actions to change a
state-chartered mutual institution to a stock type institution require formal notice
of special meetings to vote on such proposals. 12 C.F.R. §§ 546.5, 563.22-1(d)
(1974). Opportunity for waiver is not specifically mentioned, as it is in the general notice provisions for special meetings. Id. § 544.5(3) (b). By negative inference it might be concluded that notice for these types of special meetings cannot
be waived. Waiver is not specifically precluded, however, and the section is sufficiently ambiguous to be interpreted either way.
79. For examples of this problem see Herman, supra note 4, at 791.
80. 12 C.F.R. § 544.6(b) (1974).
81. Id.
82. Id. § 544.1 (a)(4).
83. For examples of this abuse see Herman, supra note 4, at 794.
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exercise that right. To insure that the right to vote can be exercised,
it is imperative that the federal regulation allowing waiver of notice
requirements through membership consent be eliminated. In addition the regulations should be amended to require a minimum quorum at association meetings.84
Director elections. The Code of Federal Regulations provides
only general guidance concerning procedures for the independent
nominations of directors for election by association members.8"
Association managements are free to create their own nominating
procedures. Under present regulations it is a simple task for managements to promulgate burdensome nominating procedures so as
to minimuze the nomination of opposition candidates by the membership. For example, an association, acting quite legally, could
provide in its by-laws that director nominations may be made only
by a nominating committee which is appointed by the association
president, or that a candidate's name may not be placed in nomination unless a certain percent of all eligible voters, perhaps ten
percent or more, support the candidate. Such provisions could preclude many members from effectively participating in the election
of association directors. The FHLBB should devise specific regulations to limit the ability of association managements to establish
such procedural rules.
Proxies. Because voting by members of an association may be
conducted in person or by proxy,86 the procedures established for
the use of proxies are a central part of an association's voting
process. Until 1971, the FHLBB provided for the use of proxies for
membership voting,8 7 but gave no guidance as to proxy form or
manner of use. 88 By default, such matters were left to managements or multifarious state laws 9 for determination." Finally, in
84. For example, the regulations could be amended to provide that the presence, in person or by proxy, of a majority of the members at an association meeting constitutes a quorum.
85. An optional by-law provides for nomination by a committee appointed by
the association's president. In addition, independent nominations may be made
by members who file with the association in writing at least 10 days prior to the
date of the meeting. 12 C.F.R. § 544.6(a) (1974).
86. Id. § 544.1 (a) (4). A member saver of an association may, through an
instrument called a proxy, authorize another person to vote for him on association
matters. The person substituted by the member to represent him at association
meetings is called a proxy holder.
87. Id.
88. Until 1968, no information was regularly collected by supervisory authorities on the subject of proxy holdings and use. Herman, supra note 4, at 799
n.35.

see

89. For an extensive discussion of individual: state laws regarding proxy use
UNITED STATES SAVINGS AND LOAN LEAGUE XXII LEGAL BULLETIN, 99-103

(1956).
90. For examples of how various courts have handled the proxy issue, see

Federal Home Loan Bank Bd. v. Greater Del. Valley Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n,
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1971,1 federal regulations regarding potential holders of proxies'1
as well as definition,9 3 form, 4 and solicitation of proxies9" were
These regulations standardized proxy procedures and
issued.
dramatically extended supervision into an area long left vacant by
federal regulation and the courts. 6
The FHLBB failed, however, to provide sufficiently detailed
guidelines on the important questions of proxy form and content.
Under present federal law there are no restrictions on the breadth
97
of authority which can be granted to a proxy holder by a proxy.
A carefully drafted proxy could grant extremely broad voting
power to its holder. For example, there is no requirement that
proxies be confined only to ordinary questions such as director
elections. A single proxy may grant its holder authority to vote

on all matters, including extraordinary actions such as charter
amendments, conversion, voluntary dissolution and merger. The
FHLBB should develop guidelines limiting the contents of proxies

so that proxy holders may be granted authority to vote only on
questions of ordinary importance. A separate solicitation of the
membership should be required on such questions as charter
amendments and mergers.
277 F.2d 437, 441 (3d Cir. 1960); Pearson v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 149
So. 2d 891, 895, 896 (Fla. Ct. App. 1963); Ochs v. Washington Heights Fed. Sav.

& Loan Ass'n, 17 N.Y.2d 82, 84, 215 N.E.2d 485, 487, 268 N.Y.S.2d 294, 296
(1966); People of the State of Illinois ex rel. Klyczek v. Citizens Fed. Say. of
Chicago Heights, Case No. 58 S 10748 (Super. Ct., Cook County, I11.1958), an
unreported trial case discussed at length in UNITED STATES SAVINGS AND LOAN
LEAGUE, LEGAL BULLETIN,

Mar. 1960, at 59-68.

91. 36 FED. REG. 19973 (1971).
92. 12 C.F.R. § 569.3 (1974). Proxies may designate as holders only living
natural persons, with the following exceptions: (1) the proxy may designate a
specified title or office, if a natural person; (2) the proxy may designate a committee composed solely of natural persons, including a committee composed solely
of the board of directors.
93. Id. § 569.1.
94. Id. § 569.2. Federal regulations now specify three form requirements. First, the proxy must be revocable at will by the member giving it. Second,
the proxy may not be part of any other document. This prevents the management
from concealing proxy provisions together with other contractual provisions signed
by a member at the time he opens his account. Finally, the proxy must be clearly
labeled "Revocable Proxy" in large, bold face type.
95. Id. § 569.4. Solicitation provisions (a) require that proxies be dated exactly as of the date of signing by the security holder, and (b) preclude any proxy
solicitation that (1) contains any false or misleading statement with respect to
any material fact or (2) omits to state any material fact necessary to prevent any
solicitation from being false or misleading.
96. Without direction from the FHLBB, courts had been timid to enter into
the proxy area.

The result has been frustrating for association members.

See

Federal Home Loan Bank Bd. v. Greater Del. Valley Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n,
277 F.2d 437, 441 (3d Cir. 1960).
97. Some state courts have applied at least a modicum of restraint to the
breadth of proxies employed by state savings and loan associations. McKee v.
Home Say. & Trust Co., 122 Iowa 731, 98 N.W. 609 (1904); Fidelity Bldg. &
Loan Ass'n v. Thompson, 25 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930).
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The FHLBB also has failed to provide guidelines on the
question of proxy duration. Present federal law places no restraint
upon the length of time a proxy may remain valid. Some state
laws restrict proxy duration to six months, while other states permit proxies of unlimited duration." These "perpetual proxies,"
although revocable at will, 9 provide added security for existing
management, and further insulate management from membership
control. To enhance the participation and control of association
members, proxy solicitations should be required annually. Such a
requirement would not unduly burden managements since the
proxy solicitation could be included, easily and inexpensively, in
other association mailings.
Until recently, the power of substitution, by which a proxy
holder may grant to another his proxy powers, also was left largely
uncontrolled. 10 0 Without controls, proxy holders, usually the directors or officers of an association, have at times treated proxies as
their personal property and have sold their control to the highest
bidding surrogate holder. 10 ' In 1973, after eleven years of litigation, an association and its members finally succeeded in attacking this practice of sale of proxy control for personal gain. 0 2
In Beverly Hills Federal Savings and Loan Association v.
Federal Home Loan Bank Board,' a federal savings and loan
association sought relief from an allegedly illegal transfer of the
control of the Association by the defendants, who were holders
of proxies. For many years, at the request of the Association's
management, depositors and borrowers in the Association had
signed proxies appointing the defendants to vote in their behalf.
While these proxies were in effect, the defendants were able to
exercise complete control over the Association. The court found
that as officers, directors and proxy holders, these defendants
"stood in a position of trust and confidence with the Association's
members and owed them those obligations commonly associated
with fiduciaries. ....
Further, the court held that the transfer of control of the Association by these defendants constituted
a breach of their common law duty of good faith, 10 5 rendering
98. See note 89 supra.
99. See note 94 supra.

100. The FHLBB merely required that the substitute qualify as a living natural
person. 12 C.F.R. § 569.3 (1974).
101. The fact that such abuses exist is well documented in Herman, supra note
4, at 798-801.

See also Beverly Hills Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Webb, 406 F.2d

1275 (9th Cir. 1969); Reich v. Webb, 336 F.2d 153 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied,

380 U.S. 915 (1965).
102. Beverly Hills Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd.,

371 F. Supp. 306 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
103.

Id.

104. Id. at 314.
105. Id.
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them liable for the transfer even though their conduct did not violate any specific regulation of the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board. 10 6 The court explained that the illegality of the transfer
was not premised upon an express violation of FHLBB regulations, but arose from a breach of implied common law duties of
fair dealing, disclosure and trust. 1 7 At present, Beverly Hills is
the only case which has addressed the problem of federal association proxy transfers. The decision reached by the court in that
case was no doubt the correct one, and hopefully it will be received favorably by other jurisdictions.
Inadequate proxy regulation allows unscrupulous managements to sell proxies for personal gain or to attain autonomous, selfperpetuating positions in savings and loan associations. 10 8 To eliminate these abuses, it is imperative that the FHLBB strengthen its
present proxy regulations.
Grievance Procedures. The FHLBB has issued no regula-

tions setting forth formal procedures by which association members, having become aware of management abuses, may urge the
FHLBB to take action against an association. Many members have
brought actions against association managements on their own,
only to be informed by the courts that they must exhaust their administrative remedies with the FHLBB before the courts will hear
their case.' 09 In most instances such court decisions have put a
stop to members' attempts to attack abusive practices by management, because neither the courts nor the FHLBB have explained
satisfactorily what administrative remedies must be exhausted.
Lacking specific formal procedures to initiate disciplinary action, 1 0 members are left with nothing but informal methods to
initiate FHLBB action."
Such informal requests only infrequently result in Board action against an association. Although
some courts have been critical of this lackadaisical exercise of
power by the FHLBB, most have been unwilling to intervene in
an area preempted by governmental regulation." 2
106. Id. at 316-17.
107. Id.
108. MARVELL, supra note 7, at 14; Herman, supra note 4, at 798-800.
109. Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947); People v. Coast Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 98 F. Supp. 311 (S.D. Cal. 1951); Reich v. Webb, 218 Cal. App.
2d 862, 32 Cal. Rptr. 803 (1963); Larwood Co. v. San Diego Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 185 Cal. App. 2d 450, 8 Cal. Rptr. 362 (1960); Woodward v. Broadway
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 111 Cal. App. 2d 218, 244 P.2d 567 (1952). But see
In re Election of Directors, 268 App. Div. 414, 5 N.Y.S.2d 816 (1944).
110. Treffinger, Administrative Procedure and the Home Loan Bank Board,
15 BusINEss LAW. 873, 875-76 (1960).
111. Such informal methods might range from letters and telephone calls to
the FHLBB, to camping in the halls of the FHLBB in Washington, D.C.
112. See, e.g., People v. Coast Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 98 F. Supp. 311, 319
(S.D. Cal. 1951).
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To resolve this dilemma the FHLBB either should provide
association members with effective administrative remedies or, in
the alternative, it should make clear to the members of associations
and to the courts that in fact there are no administrative remedies
available for the members to exhaust. Such a pronouncement by
the FHLBB would open the courtroom doors to suits initiated by
associations and their members. These privately initiated suits
would serve to supplement the regulatory activities of the FHLBB.
While the FHLBB is and should remain the primary regulatory
agency for federal savings and loan associations, it has not been
particularly successful in defending members' rights. Thus, additional regulation through the courts by association members is
necessary. Such enforcement of government agency regulations
by private individuals is not a new idea. Private actions are presently allowed in the area of securities fraud violations to supplement the regulatory activities of the Securities and Exchange Commission." 8
Until the FILBB acts, however, the courts should take cognizance of the lack of realistic administrative remedies available to
savings and loan members and should readily grant standing to
associations and members in a derivative capacity to pursue their
judicial remedies. Only in the Beverly Hills"4 case and in Murphy
v. ColonialFederal Savings & Loan Association"' have the courts
taken a progressive view and rejected the long accepted argument
that members and associations lack standing because the field of
association regulation is preempted by the regulatory activity of the
FHLBB.
C. Membership Information and Disclosure
Procedural reforms in the areas of notice, director elections,
proxies and membership grievances are necessary to enforce the
membership rights of association members. Such reforms will have
meaning, however, only if members are made aware of their existence. Thus, improved methods of informing members of their
rights are necesary before such procedural reforms will be helpful.
Traditionally, one of the strengths of the mutual savings and
loan association was a well-informed, actively participating membership."" Today, in contrast, membership ignorance of associa113. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1971),
and implementing regulations, 17 C.F.R. 240.10(b)-5 (1974).
114. Beverly Hills Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd.,
371 F. Supp. 306 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
115. 388 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1967). In Murphy dissident members of a federal
association were granted independent standing in an action brought to obtain a
membership list from the management.
116. A. TEcK, MUTUAL SAVINGS BANKS AND SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS:
See note 3 supra.
ASPECTS OF GROwTH 23 (1968).
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tion activities is the general rule. Members seldom know enough
about association affairs to exercise intelligently their membership
voting rights and, in fact, many members are unaware they possess
such rights. 117 Ignorance of this magnitude can breed apathy
among members and discourage membership participation in the
operation of associations to the ultimate detriment of the saving
public. Effective membership control of management activities
will occur only if association members are aware of their rights.
A major factor contributing to this information gap has been
the increased size and complexity of the savings and loan industry.
Modem mutuals demand sophisticated management techniques,
specialized skills, efficient operation, and full time salaried personnel.' 1 8 The informal methods of disseminating information previously used by association managements are no longer adequate.1 1 9 It is practically impossible for the average member,
whose time and resources are limited, to inform himself of his association's operations. Improved methods of disclosure are needed to
insure intelligent voter participation by association members. The
means of disclosure presently required by the FHLBB and state
supervisory agencies have not kept pace with industry growth and
are grossly insufficient.
Inspection rights. If a member is to make intelligent voting
decisions regarding the leadership and the direction his association
is to take, it is important that records of the association be made
available to him, so that he can measure the association's performance. In addition, voter lists are necessary to facilitate communication among eligible voters in the association. These provide the opportunity for those favoring or disfavoring one policy
or another to amass support from fellow members. Unfortunately,
because of the present confusion surrounding a member's right to
inspect association books and records, this information is not
readily obtainable.
It has long been settled that in the absence of a statute to the
contrary, a shareholder in a corporation has the inherent right to
inspect the financial records of that corporation, so long as the inspection is for a "proper purpose"' 2 0 and is undertaken at a reasonable time and place.' 2 ' This rule applies with equal force to bank117. MARVELL, supra note 7, at 14.
118. See notes 11-17 and accompanying text supra.
119. See note 3 supra.
120. Proper purpose has been held to include the determination of the existence of mismanagement, 5 W. FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 2213, 2219,
2253.1 (1967), and ascertainment of names and addresses of other shareholders
in order to communicate with them concerning corporate affairs, Id. § 2225.
121. In Guthrie v. Harkness, 199 U.S. 148, 153 (1905), the Supreme Court
granted a shareholder of a national bank the right to inspect books and records.
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ing corporations as well as other corporations. 2 2 Since mutual
savings and loan associations are merely specialized banking corporations, it would appear that members of such associations
23
should have the right to inspect association records.1
In the absence of a state statute to the contrary, some state
courts interpreting state law have held that association members
are entitled to inspect association records. 124 Other courts, however, have interpreted state statutes as denying membership access
to such records. 25 Those state courts which have denied inspection rights to members have based their decisions on what they
often call the "quasi-public" nature of savings and loan associations. 2 6 They note that savings and loan associations are not private corporations, 12 7 but rather are subject to extensive supervision and control by state agencies. 12 Thus, the courts reason that
membership inspection rights are pre-empted by the administrative authority of the government agencies, and sole responsibility
for the protection of membership interests rests in the hands of
these agencies. Such court decisions have placed an unnecessary
restraint upon the ability of association members to safeguard
their interests in the association. State administrative agencies
cannot be expected to protect adequately all the interests of association members. Thus, it is important that members be entitled
122. Id. at 154.
123. It appears that the Supreme Court would require that members be allowed
to inspect the books for such purposes as compiling lists of the membership but
would not require that completed membership lists be compiled or furnished to
the members on request. id.
124. See, e.g., Henzel v. Patterson Bldg. & Loan Ass'n No. 2, 128 Pa. Super.
531, 194 A. 683 (1937).
125. State ex rel. Cotonio v. Italo-American Homestead Ass'n, 177 La. 766,
149 So. 449 (1933); Ulmer v. Falmouth Loan & Bldg. Ass'n, 93 Me. 302, 45 A.
32 (1899); DeFazio v. Haven Say. & Loan Ass'n, 22 N.J. 511, 126 A.2d 639
(1956); State ex rel. Wicks v. Puget Sound Say. & Loan Ass'n, 8 Wash. 2d 599,
113 P.2d 70 (1941); State ex rel. Schomberg v. Home Mutual Bldg. & Loan Ass'n,
220 Wis. 649, 265 N.W. 701 (1936), all of which deny members access to voter
lists. See also Sanders v. Neely, 19 So. 2d 424, 429 (Miss. 1944), where the court
in dicta implied that savings and loan members in Mississippi had no inspection
rights.
To the contrary, however, some state courts, relying on a state statute, have
specifically granted members the right to inspect association records. See, e.g.,
White v. Smith, 256 N.C. 218, 123 S.E.2d 628 (1968), where the Supreme Court

of North Carolina, interpreting a state statute, upheld the right of members of a
savings and loan association to obtain a list of the names and addresses of the
members of the association for the purpose of discussing with, campaigning
among, and soliciting proxies from other members in preparation for an association meeting.
126. See, e.g., DeFazio v. Haven Say. & Loan Ass'n, 22 N.J. 511, 126 A.2d
639 (1956).
127. See, e.g., id. at 517, 126 A.2d at 644,
128. See, e.g., id,
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to inspect association records and voter lists so they may obtain
information necessary to safeguard their own interests.
Until recent years the federal law has been unclear as to
whether members of federal savings and loan associations
have the right to inspect association books. Federal statutes
and regulations are silent on the subject of inspection, and the
courts have infrequently addressed the question.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held, in
1958, that in the absence of a statute or rules and regulations which
confer the right of inspection upon a member of a federal savings
and loan association, an individual member of such association has
no common law or statutory right to inspect association books and
records.129 The Daurelle court denied members access to records
and effectively precluded members from obtaining a list of the
names and addresses of association members.18 This decision virtually eliminated any opportunity for members to communicate
among themselves concerning association matters. Following the
Daurelle case, all that remained of the inspection rights of members
of federal associations in West Virginia was a narrow exception
allowing access by individual members to their own accounts.
In 1966, the New York Court of Appeals arrived at a different
result from that reached by the Daurelle court. In Ochs v. Washington Heights Federal Savings and Loan Association,131 the
court held that a member" 2 of a federally chartered savings and
loan association, who posessed the right to vote in the annual election of board of directors, also possessed the right to inspect the
association's membership list. 3
The court emphasized that unless members have the right of
inspection, their statutory rights under the charter are reduced to
"idle gestures."' 4 Recognizing the need to protect the confidential fiduciary relationship between the savings and loan association
and its members, however, the Ochs court placed some restrictions on the right of inspection.'8 5 In order both to insure the
privacy of individual accounts and to preserve the essential ele129. Daurelle v. Traders Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 143 W. Va. 674, 104 S.E.2d
320 (1958).
130. Id.
131. 12 N.Y.2d 82, 215 N.E.2d 485, 268 N.Y.S.2d 294 (1966).
132. The Ochs court qualified the term "member" to mean a member in good
standing who exhibits good faith and proper purpose. Id. at 88, 215 N.E.2d at
489, 268 N.Y.S.2d at 298. In practice, of course, any member who tries to inspect
records will first be required to litigate his "qualifications."
133. Id. at 87, 215 N.E.2d at 488, 268 N.Y.S.2d at 298.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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ments of membership inspection, membership lists were restricted
to "the names and addresses of the borrowers and depositors, not
identified as such, and with no reference to the amount borrowed
or on deposit or to the number of votes possessed" by each mem136
ber.
Since the Ochs decision, the federal courts have resolved
some of the confusion concerning a member's right to inspect
membership lists by following and extending the holding in
that case. In 1967 the United States Court of Appeals, in Murphy v.
Colonial Federal Savings and Loan Association,'3 7 addressed the
question of whether members in a federal savings and loan association have a right of access to voter lists. The court held that
an election of directors in which the opposition is deprived
of any reasonable opportunity to ascertain the names and
addresses of electors known to the management was unfair
under federal law. 13 8
Citing Ochs with approval, the court noted that it seemed quite
appropriate to adopt as "federal common law" the principle that
members of federal savings and loan associations have the right to
inspect membership lists. 13' 9 Noting the existence of numerous corporate shareholder voting list statutes throughout the country, the
court granted to members of federal savings and loan associations
the right to inspect records for the purpose of compiling voter
lists. 140 Further, the court gave members the option of either having lists furnished to them or paying the cost of making such lists. 14
At present, Murphy represents the federal common law in the area
of membership inspection rights.
The Murphy case is one of the few progressive court decisions
involving the rights of savings and loan association members. It is
apparent that the Murphy court recognized not only the absurdity
of members having no membership rights, but also the wisdom
of a dual system of control of association managements-where
the external supervision of an association management by a government agency is supplemented by internal supervision through
142
membership surveillance.
It should be noted, however, that neither the Murphy case nor
federal statutes specifically preclude the use of general charter or
136. Id. at 88, 215 N.E.2d at 488, 268 N.Y.S.2d at 298.

137. 388 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1967).
138. Id. at 612.
139. Id. at 612 n.2.
140. Id.
141. Id.

142. See note 184 and accompanying text infra.
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by-law provisions to deny federal savings and loan association
members access to voter lists. In fact, present FHLBB regulations
provide for the optional use of a provision in association by-laws
which allows a member to inspect only those records pertaining to
his personal accounts. 4 ' Additionally, this optional provision provides for a feeble mechanism whereby members may communicate with the membership, using the management of the association as the intermediary.' 44 Any such communications between
members must first be submitted to the association's management
for its approval.' 4 5 If the communications are approved, the management will mail them at the member's expense. 146 The possibilities for abuse and delay by an uncooperative management under such a system are obvious.
Statutory embodiment of the Murphy decision is needed to
eliminate doubt on the inspection issue. Inspection rights of members should be fully legitimized to encourage membership surveillance of association affairs. Only by making more information
available to members of mutual associations will mutual democracy
serve its purpose.
General disclosure requirements. Although extensive disclosure regulations are prescribed by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) for many corporations, 1 47 because of specific
exemption provisions most SEC disclosure requirements do not
apply to mutual savings and loan associations. 4 '
When an association opens an account for a new customer,
the FHLBB allows the use of an extremely simple form of savings
or investment certificate.' 49 No indication of voting, dividend,
withdrawal, or other membership rights need to be included in the
certificate." 0 When a saver opens an account with an association,
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

12 C.F.R. § 544.6(g) (1974).
Id.
Id.
Id.
The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (1970), requires dis-

closure of information through registration of securities offered to the public.
148. The United States Supreme Court has held that mutual savings accounts
are "securities" within the meaning of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967). Nevertheless, savings and loan secu-

rities are specifically exempted from SEC registration and disclosure requirements.
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(5) (1970); Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(2)(C) (1970).
It is important to note, however, that even though mutual savings and loan
securities are exempted from specific registration and disclosure requirements they
are not so exempted from SEC antifraud provisions. Securities Act of 1933, 15
U.S.C. §§ 771.(2), 77q.(a) and (c), 77x (1970); Securities Exchange Act of

1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j.(b) (1970), and implementing regulation 17 C.F.R. §
240.10(b)-5 (1974).
149. 12C.F.R. § 563.2 (1974).
150. Id. Disclosure requirements demand only that savings certificates display
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he makes a choice between the available savings and loan associations competing for the use of his dollars. The associations should
be required to make more information available to a prospective
saver so that he can make an intelligent selection. It should be the
affirmative obligation of the savings and loan association to dis-

close fully not only the terms of the savings contract, but also the
existence of membership voting rights, and the mechanics for exercising these rights. In addition, a financial statement should be

made available along with any material facts which might evidence
the insecurity of the association. 15 ' Finally, a statement inviting
requests for additional information and explaining the proper
method for making such a request should be displayed.' 52
Annual reporting requirements of the FHLBB are also surprisingly inadequate for membership needs. An annual "Statement
of Conditions," which may be mailed to each member or merely
published in a newspaper of general circulation, is all that is required.1"3 The FHLBB requires that the statement contain only the
most superficial financial data.'
Some associations voluntarily
include additional information, but mention of ownership or voting rights normally is avoided.'
provisions relating to interest paid, amount of minimum balance, renewal, and
other terms of the savings contract. Id. § 563.3-1(c).
151. For example, the statement should include any prior or existing sanctions
imposed upon the association by the FHLBB, existence of any significant legal
proceedings, and defaults of indebtedness by the association.
152. Under present FHLBB regulations, upon request an association must provide to any member a true copy of its charter and by-laws. 12 C.F.R. § 563.1
(1974). There is no requirement, however, that members be informed of their
right to make such a request.
153. Id. § 545.23.
154. A simple balance sheet is all that is required. Assets are reported in eight
categories: mortgage loans, other loans, real estate owned, loans and contracts
made to facilitate sale of real estate, cash on hand, investments and securities,
fixed assets, and other assets. Only the following liability entries are required:
savings accounts, advances from Federal Home Loan Banks, other borrowed
money, loans in process, other liabilities, specific reserves, general reserves, and
surpluses. Information taken from the FHLBB "Statement of Conditions" form
received by the author from the San Francisco Federal Home Loan Bank pursuant
to a request under 12 C.F.R. § 545.23 (1974).
155. Additional information, if included at all, is usually limited to a brief "pep
talk" statement by the executive vice-president. Usually included is news of asset
increases over the previous year, the opening of new offices or the remodeling
of old ones, a list of officers and directors, and a reassurance that the coming
year will be a period of expansion and progress. Some associations include a brief
balance sheet from the previous year so that individual categories of assets and
liabilities may be compared with present financial balances. A few also state that
more complete financial statements will be made available upon request. This indication that further information is available to a member is the only statement
from the management that even remotely suggests to the saver that he might also
possess certain membership rights. Information taken from sample association
statements of condition collected by the author on his visits to savings and loan
associations in California.
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Clearly, it should be the affirmative obligation of an association to provide more detailed information in its annual statement.
The statement should include the time, date and place of upcoming

annual meetings, and an explanation of the member's voting initiative rights, including the mechanics of proxy and in-person voting.
Financial statements should be more thorough, to include an income statement, a flow of funds statement, and a balance sheet for
at least the preceding fiscal year. The use of generally accepted accounting principles should be required and the accuracy of the

statements should be certified by the association's chief financial
officer. In addition, the annual statement should include a list and
organizational chart of the relationship of the association to all its
affiliates, a description of material changes in business during the
fiscal year, 5 ' the names of principal holders of existing proxies, 157
biographical information concerning the present directors of the
institution, 15 8 and management's compensation. 59
In attempting to obtain the information that FHLBB disclosure requirements fail to provide, aggrieved members have sought
aid from the courts."' Unfortunately, the courts have been noticeably timid in providing remedies to members, and actions to require more information from management have been uniformly
unsuccessful.'"'
2
In Pearson v. First Federal Savings and Loan Association,"6
plaintiffs, who were members of the association, charged that at the
inception of their membership in the association, they had been

required to sign a signature card containing a continuing proxy in
favor of the seven directors. The plaintiffs also alleged that the ma156. These material changes might include: changes in control of the association, acquisition or disposition of association assets, updates on legal proceedings
or sanctions applied by the FHLBB or other supervisory agencies, defaults of indebtedness by the association, material modifications in the voting structure or
mechanism of the association, changes in the investment portfolio, and revaluations of assets of the association or its affiliates.
157. Persons or groups holding more than 10 percent of voting proxies should
be listed in the annual statements with their addresses and the number. of. proxies
held.
158. For example, the directors' names, the expiration dates of their terms,
their ages, and a list of the positions and offices they presently hold in the association should be included in the annual statement. In addition the directors'
principal occupations and their employers should be noted. Also, the financial
interest of each director in affiliates doing business with the association or its customers should be included in the statement.
159. Executive compensation in mutuals is generally greater than in stock associations. Herman, supra note 4, at 897.
160. See, e.g., Federal Home Loan Bank Bd. v. Greater Del. Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 277 F.2d 437 (3d Cir. 1960); Pearson v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n,
149 So. 2d 891 (Fla. Ct. App. 1963).
161. See, e.g., cases cited in note 163 supra.
162. 149 So. 2d 891 (Fla. Ct. App. 1963).
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jority of the members were unaware of their own voting rights in the
association, and that they were not told how the directors and officers were selected.' 6 3 The plaintiffs further charged that by virtue
of the continuing proxies, the Board of Directors of the association
were in a strategic position to perpetuate their existence in office
and manipulate the association to their own personal gain. 64 In
their prayer for relief the plaintiffs sought to have the directors
ousted from office and to have the proxies which had been signed
by the members declared invalid. 6 5 The court summarily dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action.' 6
In FederalHome Loan Bank Board v. GreaterDelaware Valley Federal Savings and Loan Association,6 ' the FHLBB brought
an action to have a particular proxy solicitation declared invalid,
claiming that certain crucial information concerning management's motivation for the solicitation involved had been omitted
from the proxy statement.'6 8 The court held that the shareholders
had been given no erroneous or misleading information, and in the
absence of a "stated or formal requirement of law," an omission of
this sort did not give rise to a cause of action.'6 9
Pearson and Delaware Valley illustrate the general reluctance
of the courts to break new ground in the specialized, highly regulated area of savings and loan associations. Normally, due to a court's
lack of specialized competency, the reluctance would be accepta170
ble; but considering the FHLBB's record of regulatory failure, it
is time the courts began interpreting membership rights more liberally in an effort to fill the regulatory gaps.
III.

OPPOSITION TO REFORM

The reform proposals which have been suggested in this article would broaden and protect the ownership rights incident to
membership in a mutual savings and loan association. Before conhowever, argucluding that these measures should be adopted,
71
ments opposing such reform must be considered.'
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id. at 893.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 896.

167. 277 F.2d 437 (3d Cir. 1960).

168. Id. at 438.
169. Id. at 441. Not until eleven years after Delaware Valley did the FHLBB
finally prescribe expanded disclosure requirements that prevent the use of proxy
solicitations which contain material omissions. 12 C.F.R. § 569.4(c) (1974).
Thus, Delaware Valley would probably be decided differently today, since it dealt

specifically with proxy solicitation.
170.

Note, Mutual-to-Stock Conversions and the Federal Home Loan Bank

Board, 82 YALE L.J. 559, 567 (1973).
171. It is probably not mere coincidence, nor is it surprising, that the major
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It is arguable that (1) change would increase costs; (2) even

if members had broader membership rights, there would be no
incentive to exercise these rights because of the present system
of insured accounts and interest rate ceilings; and (3) reform
would create instability and upheaval in the industry, eroding public confidence in savings institutions.
A.

Increased Costs

It is true that additional expenses would be incurred by association managements if the reforms proposed in this article were
1 73
adopted. 1 72 Initiating reforms in the areas of notice,' proxy solici74 and annual reporting 173 would require the association
tation,

managements to expend additional time and money in the preparation and mailing of necessary materials.

Any cost increase would be minimal, however, since associations already are required to provide annual statements of condition 1 76 to their memberships and additional disclosure information

could easily be included in the same mailings. Thus, it appears that

the possibility of increased costs poses an insignificant obstacle to

membership reform.
B.

Lack of Incentive to Exercise Rights
A second and more persuasive argument leveled against re-

form in the savings and loan industry is that under the present system, savers neither want nor need extensive membership rights. On
first analysis it may appear that interest rate ceilings177 and insured
savings accounts 7s remove all incentives for exercising member-

opponents of reform are the mutual savings and loan managements. They have
the most to lose should major reforms be instituted which may substantially affect
management autonomy and control. Wall Street Journal, Dec. 31, 1971, at 16,
col. 1.
172. Herman, supra note 4, at 790 n.16.
173. See notes 72-83 and accompanying text supra.
174. See notes 86-108 and accompanying text supra.
175. See notes 153-59 and accompanying text supra.
176. See notes 153-55 and accompanying text supra.
177. 38 FED.REG. 18459 (1971).
178. The Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) insures
depositors' savings accounts of up to $40,000 against loss. 12 U.S.C. § 1724(b)
(1974). The FSLIC functions much like any insurance company. Participating
savings and loan associations sign insurance contracts with the FSLIC who, in
the event of association failure, pays association savers for the loss of their savings. Associations pay the FSLIC insurance premiums for this coverage. If an
association fails, a receiver is appointed for purposes of liquidation, and usually
within 10 days FSLIC officials are on hand with cash to compensate account
holders for losses suffered. MARVELL, supra note 7, at 84, 272. Participating
members of the FSLIC program account for 97.2 percent of all savings and loan
industry assets. 1974 FAct BOOK, supra note 11, at 74, 125.
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ship prerogatives. With financial interests of savers well protected
under the present system, additional reform, so the argument goes,
would be merely an academic exercise yielding no measurable practical benefits.
Although economic incentives to exercise membership rights
have been greatly reduced, they have not been eliminated, and incentives of both a direct and indirect nature remain. It is true that to
the extent association earnings exceed present interest rate ceilings,
surplus profits cannot be returned as cash dividends to the membership. 170 This limitation, however, should not weaken membership concern with association mismanagement. First, some experts
believe that interest rate ceilings lack a rational basis and will not
continue indefinitely. I SO If interest rate ceilings are eliminated,
members of mutual savings and loan associations would be eligible
for cash dividend payments, and the incentive to demand honest
and efficient association management would be increased.
Second, although the return of cash dividends to members
presently is restricted, there still remains the opportunity for return
of "soft" money dividends to members in the form of incidental
services.' 8 ' The mutual form of association is uniquely suited to
serving the saving public due to its cooperative customer ownership structure. If membership rights were reformed association
members would be better able to direct the efforts of association
managements away from obtaining management benefits and
toward improving the services provided for member savers.
Third, since deposit amounts in excess of $40,000 are not
totally covered by insurance, some members can suffer a financial
loss if mismanagement results in a failure of the association.
Three states, Maryland, Massachusetts and Ohio, operate independent savings
insurance programs. MARVELL, supra note 7, at 86.
179. See ANNOTATED MANUAL OF THE FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK BOARD REGULATIONS 68.1-69 (1973).
180. HAYWOOD & LINKE, THE REGULATION OF DEPosrr INTEREST RATES 15, 16
& n.6 (1968); REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITrEE ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, Chapter III (1963).
181. Incidental services can be offered in many forms: payroll savings programs, postage-paid save-by-mail services, convenient office hours, drive-in win-

dows, night deposit facilities, free safe deposit boxes, traveler's checks, notary
services, free checking accounts at banks, trust deed and note collection services,
free income tax preparation, group insurance plans, and group travel and entertainment discounts. Information collected from UNITED STATES SAVINGS AND
LOAN LEAGUE, XXV LEGAL BULLETIN 145 (1959), and direct inquiry at various

savings and loan associations.
The present legal authority of a federal mutual savings and loan association
to provide such incidental services is derived from the "objects and powers" clause
of its charter as prescribed by the FHLBB: "The objects of the association are

to promote thrift. .. . [T]his association shall have power to do all things reasonably incident to the accomplishment of its express objects and the performance
of its express powers." 12 C.F.R. § 544.1(a)(3) (1974).
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Thus, despite the interest rate ceilings and the insured savings
accounts there remain practical incentives for mutual members to
exercise their membership rights. Because such incentives do continue to exist, reform cannot be rejected as a mere academic exercise with no practical benefits.
C.

Effects Upon Stability and Public Confidence

It is argued that if membership voting rights are reformed and
strengthened, association managements will be forced to contend
with frequent challenges by opposition candidates. 18 2 Management personnel continually will be replaced by such candidates,,
thereby depriving the association of a stable leadership with experience and seasoned judgment. Clearly, a constant turnover in the
makeup of association managements might undermine public confidence in savings institutions, causing widespread withdrawals of
savings. These arguments are unpersuasive, however, for there is
no reason to believe a well-informed, self interested member will
dislodge honest, responsible management groups.
With reforms in disclosure and proxy solicitation procedures,
incumbent and opposition candidates for board directorships will
have equal opportunity to garner support from voting members.
Only a grossly complacent or unresponsive management would
arouse the broadly based opposition among members necessary for
management removal in a mutual association.'
The great value of increasing membership rights lies in the
internal policing effect such an increase would have on association
managements. Constant membership surveillance of management
activities and the threat of ouster by members, even if unlikely,
would certainly cause management to think twice before engaging
in questionable practices such as lax cost discipline and management profit taking. This deterrent effect alone is worth the price of
membership reform. The ultimate result of such reform would be
the strengthening of the FSLIC program by reducing the risk of
association failure," and the reduction of the burden upon the
182. Herman, supra note 4, at 790.
183. Even with rehabilitated membership rights, the nature of mutual owner-

ship makes it difficult for opposition candidates in mutual associations to amass
large blocks of votes. In a federal association, the ability of an opposition candidate to gather the necessary votes is restricted by a federal regulation which
places a maximum limit on the number of votes which each association member
may have. 12 C.F.R. § 544.1(a) (4) (1974).
184. FSLIC, like any insurance company must rely upon broadly based solvency and non-failure of its insureds, so that adequate funds are available when
failures do occur. From 1965 to 1968 FSLIC was forced to make payments of
over $238 million upon default of 5 failing associations.

This forced FSLIC to

liquidate a sizeable portion of its investment portfolio at a loss of $11.8 million
in income in 1969. 1971 Hearings,supra note 30, at 88-89.
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FHLBB and other regulatory agencies of supervising the associations. Contrary to the arguments raised by opponents to reform, the
net effect of reform would actually be to strengthen the public confidence in the savings and loan industry.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Rehabilitation of corporate democracy within mutual savings
and loan associations is needed to strengthen the quality of the savings and loan industry. There is substantial evidence that savings
and loan management activities are riddled with lax cost discipline,
conflicts of interest, self-dealing, and nepotism. 18 5 The fundamental problem is that mutual managements are virtually free from supervision, both externally and internally. The FHLBB has been
unable or unwilling to eliminate these improper activities through
its own external supervisiory methods. In addition, legislative inaction and regressive court interpretations have greatly undermined
corporate democracy within mutual associations. As a result, internal supervision of management practices by association members
has been virtually nonexistent. Free from both external and internal supervision, mutual managements have become autonomous and self-perpetuating.
To remedy this lack of supervision it is imperative that the
membership rights of association members be reformed and
strengthened. Reform measures should focus on broader membership control rights, strengthened enforcement procedures in
support of these rights, and extensive disclosure requirements to
insure that mutual members are fully aware of the rights available
to them.
Rehabilitation of corporate democracy within mutual savings
and loan associations is not a complete solution. The FHLBB
should still bear the major burden for regulation of the industry.
Democratic reform and rehabilitation, however, would be of substantial benefit to both the associations and their members.
FSLIC expenses are paid primarily through its own income received from insurance premiums. MARVELL, supra note 7, at 39. Because premium rates are
set by statute, 12 U.S.C. § 1727(b)(1) (1974), the only way FSLIC can protect
its solvency is by minimizing the insured associations' risk of failure.
185. Herman, supra note 4, at 941-45.

